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Building a continental area:
identities, differences and urban
developments in Europe
Christian Vandermotten
The author would like to thank Violette Rey from the University of Paris I and the Ecole Normale
Supérieure of Fontenay/Saint-Cloud for her suggestions and comments on this text and for her
invitation to take part in a series of seminars she organised with Thérèse Saint-Julien, under the
aegis of the CNRS, on the theme ‘Questioning European identity’. The seminars provided an
opportunity for the author to refine some of the ideas set down in this article.
 
Distribution of people and wealth
1 The social production of areas is the core subject matter of geography. The result of such
spatial  production is  expressed in the distribution of  people  and of  the wealth they
produce. Maps showing population density and per capita added value summarise the
culmination,  at  a  given  time  in  history,  of  this  social  production:  they  form  the
fundamental geographical subject matter that must be explained.
2 On a  small  scale,  the  interweaving of  these  two maps  depicting  the  patterns  of  the
population and the wealth it  produces provides an image which can be described in
relatively simple terms: first the opposition (essentially east-west) between a rich Europe
and  a  poor  Europe.  Within  Europe  the  rates  of  divergence  are  exceptionally  high
compared with those of other, larger continents: the ratio between the per capita product
of the 25 % of the European population living in the richest regions and that of the 25 % of
the European population living in the poorest regions is approximately 1 to 6.5, over an
area of 10.5 million km². Admittedly it is even higher in Africa – 1 to 8.6, but over an area
of 30.3 million km². In Asia, however, it is only 1 to 4.9 over an area of 44.4 million km²,
while in Latin America it is 1 to 2.3 over an area of 20.5 million km², and finally in North
America only 1 to 1.4 over 19.3 km², with, moreover, very uniform consumption models in
the latter case. It is true that the figure would rise to 1 to 3.2 if Mexico were included with
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North America, but then should not the Maghreb and Turkey be added to Europe, since
they have similar economic and migratory relations to those of Mexico and the United
States? Enlarging Europe to encompass these close Mediterranean neighbours does not,
paradoxically, change the ratio, which remains at 1 to 6.5, but this time over an area of
14.3 million km². The diversity of ‘little Europe’ is not, therefore, simply a formula in
school manuals: it can actually be measured using the tools of the official economy. 
3 The east-west opposition is not reflected in the same way in the pattern of population:
the main population vacuums are found in the north and north-east. South-east Europe is
far from being a vacuum. It  comprises a complex mosaic in which areas with a high
density  adjoin  others  that  are  less  densely  populated,  without  this  necessarily
corresponding to the constraints of the relief: inversions of density are frequent, with
plains that are emptier than mountainous areas, or at least their piedmonts, and this was
even more marked in the last century. In the west there is an axis of high density starting
in the north of England and continuing to Italy, virtually uninterrupted by the Alps, and
stretching further south than Roger Brunet’s ‘blue banana’. Another axis of high density
branches off from the first, stretching from west to east along the southerly border of the
Hercynian mountain range, following the Hellweg and one of the routes of the German
mediaeval ‘Drang nach Osten’. However the western and northern edges of the British
Isles  are  scantily  populated,  and  in  particular  there  is  a  vast  continental  ellipsis
characterised  by  low  densities  of  population,  with  a  huge  axis  stretching  from  the
Ardennes to Andalusia, through the interior of France and the Iberian Peninsula. Madrid,
and even Paris, are isolated within this area.
 
Figure 1. Population density in Europe around 1980.
Source: J.M. Decroly, J. Vanlaer et al. (1991)
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Figure 2. Added value per inhabitant in Europe (1995).
Source: IGEAT, ULB
4 In the west wealth is in effect concentrated in the ellipsis ranging from the centre of
England in the north to Italy, with Paris already on the margin. The centre of gravity of
this ellipsis has tended to move southwards since the end of the last War. The limits of
the wealth ellipsis are encroaching on the Third Italy and advancing towards Rome, while
the centre and north of England are becoming marginalised. Weak economic areas, going
through problems  of  conversion,  have  indeed  gradually  emerged  within  the  ellipsis,
particularly on the northern flank, in the old industrial regions, with levels of per capita
product that are now hovering around those of the southern periphery in the south of
Italy and the Iberian Peninsula. But in terms of countries, differences in development are
tending to diminish and while the great Mediterranean periphery of Western Europe is
still lagging behind in economic terms, this is almost marginal compared with Eastern
Europe. Wealth per inhabitant in Scandinavia is roughly the average of Western Europe
but no higher, contrary to what may be suggested by the standard of living observed
there which is a result of the virtues of the very distributive socio-economic models and
the extent and precocious nature of environmental awareness. This is the picture that
must be clarified.
 
The role of nature
5 While  the  physical  architecture  and  climatic  pattern  may  help  to  explain  landscape
diversity within a historical and cultural dialectic, they do not justify these patterns of
population and wealth distribution, apart from the northern Europe vacuum. It is true
that the extension of  the steppes to the Pannonian plain provided an easy route for
travelling to the west for Asian horsemen and, conversely, the general orientation of
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mountains following parallels  fostered the penetration of  oceanic influences into the
interior of the continent. But north-south movements were always important, or even
more  important:  even  the  Alps  never  formed  a  barrier  to  cultural  and  economic
influences.  An exceptional  case of  topographical  unity which became the cradle of  a
political ensemble – Switzerland – is in fact based on a mixture of relative isolation and
control of Alpine passages.
6 In itself diversity in Europe is not any greater than that which can be observed in North
America, but is above all of a different nature and sensitive to a different scale, that of
small  ‘districts’,  the  ‘pays’  in  the  old  French meaning  of  the  term.  This  diversity  is
essentially based on a dialectic between economics and culture, fuelled by exchanges,
contacts, clashes, and always by the highly significant presence of man producing and
organising his  territory.  The diverse nature of  the European landscape is  marked by
modest-sized  units.  It  is  synonymous  with  smooth  connections  between  different
environments and resources located within short  distances,  and with complementary
features  and  areas  of  specialisation  which  permit  economies  of  scale  and  gains  in
productivity.  Spatial  diversity  fosters  the  conditions  necessary  for  economic
accumulation.
7 Yet Europe, despite its diverging features, is also welded together with powerful feelings
of common origins which transcend religious opposition, even if this has been a vigorous
source of division and conflict on the continent, which even fifty to eighty years of radical
political isolation of Central and Eastern Europe has not fundamentally altered. Over and
above all  the very bloody struggles,  these identity-based foundations  go back to  the
Roman Empire, to universalist Christianity and to the widespread use of Latin by the
literate of mediaeval times and of French by aristocratic classes up to the 19th century.
China  and  India  did  not  engage  in  the  kind  of  matrimonial  exchanges  that  linked
dynasties in quite distant parts of Europe from the Middle Ages on.
 
The influence of long-term historical processes
previous to the Industrial Revolution
8 From the figures supplied by, among others, Maddison (1995) and Bairoch (1997), it can
be estimated that the consequences of the Industrial Revolution and its effects multiplied
the per capita product in Europe, at a constant value, by 1.5 between the mid-18th century
and the mid-19th century, by 2.7 between the mid-19th century and the mid-20th century
and by 3.3 between 1950 and the present time, thus in other words a global multiplication
between 1750 and 2000 of over 13 (under 7 for the world average)!  During the same
period,  the  population  rose  from  160  million  to  730  million,  in  other  words  a
multiplication  by  over  60  of  total  product.  The  number  of  farmers  in  the  active
population fell  by over three-quarters to under 12 %,  or by approximately 5 % if  the
former Soviet bloc countries are excluded. Yet despite such drastic changes, which one
might  have  expected  would  radically  rearrange  the  map  of  Europe,  the  permanent
features are remarkable, at least on a small scale.
9 This is  because the effect  of  long-term historical  processes is  felt  through the socio-
political and cultural frameworks which were prematurely established and through the
way in which these frameworks were to permit subsequent economic deployment.
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10 Population density was considerably higher in the eastern than in the western part of the
Roman Empire. On the one hand the Empire comprised regions that were highly civilised,
often practising intensive farming, and on the other fairly empty areas in which it was to
establish big extensive farming for the benefit of Rome and the colonisers. 
11 This difference was to play an essential role in the future of Europe, on each side of the
line  dividing  the  Eastern  and  Western  Empire  which  was  established  during  the  4th
century and endorsed by Theodosius in 395.
12 In the east, the Empire was to continue for a long time, though in a weakened state.
Relations were to remain close between the central political power and the Church, which
under the Caesaro-papist system was subject to the former. Thus even to the present
time,  religion was  to  be  an affair  of  state,  with reciprocal  consolidation of  national,
religious and ethnic identities. Even when the state no longer existed, an authoritarian,
supervisory  Church  based  on  traditionalist  values  would  preserve  ethnic  conscience,
particularly since the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans did not make much attempt to
spread the Muslim religion1. In the west, the big land owners and barbarian chiefs who
invaded the Empire took over political power in a context of fragmented territoriality.
The relations between the feudal lords and the Church were to be much more complex,
with the Church claiming universality on a spiritual level, but playing its own game in
temporal terms – its own games, because its eminent members also held various political
positions based on land ownership and territorial status.
13 The foundations for the great schism of 1053 were thus laid as far back as the 5th century.
Missionaries spreading northwards extended the limit between the Eastern and Western
Empire, between the Greek Church and the Latin Church: Slave Europe was to remain
mainly Orthodox,  with only the parts  to the west  of  the limit  between the Empires,
Croatia and Slovenia, and the regions to the west of its northern prolongation, the Czech
Republic,  Slovakia  and  Poland,  staying  Catholic.  In  these  last  three  countries,  the
embracing  of  Western  Christianity  was  the  result  of  a  combination  of  Germanic
influences and resistance to this same German crusade or pressure.
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Figure 3. Europe in the Middle Ages.
14 In  the  confusion  and  complexity  of  the  powers  characterising  the  western  part  of
medieval Europe, which was a kind of protected ‘land’s end’ following the stabilisation of
the Vikings and their Norman ‘assimilation’, a merchant bourgeoisie was able to emerge
around the 10th -11th centuries. It was to claim in turn a link between wealth and the
political power, beside the feudal landlords system. The foundations were laid for a less
holistic society, which was also different from those in other parts of the world because of
the more nuclear families that favoured the accumulation of wealth.
15 Unlike Western Europe, Eastern and Centre-Eastern Europe was to undergo still the shock
of the last invasions from the East, the Mongols in the 13th century and the Ottomans in
the 14th and 15th centuries (and even up to the 17th century with the siege of Vienna), with
major  consequences  in  terms  of  a  delay  in  accumulating  wealth  and,  during  the
reconquests,  the  strengthening  of  imperial  and/or  aristocratic  power,  which  was  to
emerge, among other things, in the development of the second wave of serfdom and the
lack of progress in urban density, which was already initially mediocre, and even the
regression of this in the Balkans and in Russia. 
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Table 1. Urban development of Europe in 1300 (towns with over 10,000 inhabitants).
(a) Present Benelux and Nord-Pas de Calais
(b) Including Tuscany, Umbria, Marches and Latium
(c) Including Corsica
(d) Rhineland, Hesse, Baden-Württemberg, Saar, Lorraine, Alsace
(e) Without Nord-Pas de Calais, Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Comté, Corsica
(f) Moldavia-Wallachia, Moldova, Serbia and Kosovo, Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria,
Greece. Without the present European part of Turkey
(g) Brandenburg and Berlin, Saxony, Bavaria, Czech Republic, Austria, Slovenia, former big Polish
voïvodies of Zielona Gora, Wroclaw, Opole and Katowice
(h) Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Bremen, Lower Saxony, Mecklemburg, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia,
former big Polish voïvodies of Szczecin, Koszalin, Gdansk, Olsztyn, oblast of Kaliningrad, Latvia,
Estonia
(i) Former big Polish voïvodies of Warsaw, Bydgoscz, Poznan, Lodz, Kielce, Lublin, Bialystok, Krakow
and Rzeszow, Lithuania
(j) Ukraine, Bielorussia, Russian European oblasts, including Ural
(k) Hungary, Slovakia, Transylvania, Vojvodina, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina
Source: Personal calculations based on figures by P. Bairoch (1988)
16 The upsurge in trading activity in north-western Europe led to the emergence of major
circulation axes between there and the north of Italy,  extending the maritime routes
bringing luxury products from the eastern Mediterranean. Flanders and northern Italy
were then the two most urbanised regions of Europe, with the exception of Byzantium
and the southern Arab edges. These links were already the forerunners of Brunet’s ‘blue
banana’. At the outset they were based on two main axes, the one passing through the
Champagne  fairs  and  the  Rhine  axis.  While  the  Champagne  towns  were  soon  to  be
undermined  by  the  competition  from Paris,  arising  from the  strengthening  of  royal
power(3),  the Rhine axis  was  to  witness  the development  of  dense urbanisation,  but
involving small towns, partly modelled on the network of garrison towns bordering the
Roman Empire.  These were already the origins of the difference between French and
Rhineland spatial patterns. This was because, unlike the King of France, concerned above
all with the accumulation of territory around his original county, the King of Germania
was more worried about fighting for the Imperial crown, and hence more interested in
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Italian  adventures.  Since  his  position  was  based  on  an  election,  a  too  marked
strengthening of his territorial positions would hinder the election of a successor in his
hereditary lineage.  Hence there was no evolution towards the centralisation of  royal
power. The territory was also split by the strength of the ecclesiastical principalities and
the many towns competing with each other. The biggest states in the Germanic Empire
were to emerge in the east, in a much less urbanised Germania, in an area of marches and
conquered land, on agrarian estates rather than on trading bases. This eastern Germanic
area or, even further east, the regions dominated by the German traders, was organised
on the basis of two west-east axes: the Hellweg and the salt route, passing through the
rich land of the Börde and along the northern edge of the Hercynian basins, and the
Hanse maritime route. While the second essentially remained a string of ports, the first
comprised a line of considerable population density because of the good agricultural land
and the contact with the metallurgical and forestry-based settlements in the Hercynian
mountain range.
17 Because of its insular isolation and the strong control of the nobility by the monarchy,
state centralisation was introduced from the time of the Norman conquest in England,
even earlier than in France, and with it London emerged in a prime position compared
with an otherwise rather weak urban fabric.
18 Royal centralisation also occurred early in Portugal and Spain. The monarchy there was
to launch the first colonial operations at the same time as the Ottoman forces closed off
the eastern Mediterranean to trade with Europe. But here the power of the land-based
aristocracy, which was flanked by the monarchy and the Church and strengthened by the
Reconquista (which significantly weakened Muslim towns2), fuelled by resources from the
New World and the control of sheep rearing and the wool trade through the institution of
the Mesta, was to block on a long-lasting basis the development of the urban bourgeoisie.
Particularly since the Habsburgs of Spain financed their penniless coffers via the bankers
in their Italian and German territories. Imperial bankruptcies were in fact to have major
consequences  in  terms  of  curbing  the  development  of  northern  Italy  and  southern
Germany, two interspace regions that were in fact ravaged by the wars waged by the big
mercantilist states in full expansion in the 16th century. In Portugal and Spain, in any
case, the result was the very considerable primacy of the royal capital in the midst of
scantily urbanised rural areas. Thus neither Spain nor Portugal was to benefit from the
shift in the centre of gravity of the European economy to the Atlantic side. From the 16th
century  on,  the  power  of  the  land-based  aristocracy  and  the  undermining  of  the
development of the merchant bourgeoisie placed these regions in a peripheral position in
terms  of  the  European  economy,  confining  them  to  the  supply  of  agricultural  raw
materials or, later, minerals. The same was to happen in southern Italy, where the great
feudal land-ownership was introduced with the Norman conquest and was bolstered by
the lengthy absenteeism of sovereigns belonging to foreign dynasties. The influence of
Naples, the second biggest town in Europe after Paris in 1600, and still in third place in
1800 (always with the exception of Istanbul) is a reflection of the parasitical nature of an
aristocratic monarchy which extracted agricultural added value rather than establishing
a basis for a subsequent capitalist accumulation.
 
Building a continental area: identities, differences and urban developments i...
Belgeo, 1-2-3-4 | 2000
8
Table 2. Urban development in Europe in 1600 (towns with over 10,000 inhabitants).
(a) Present Benelux and Nord-Pas de Calais 
(b) Abruzzes, Molise, Campania, rest of the South, islands and Corsica
(c) Including Alsace, Lorraine, Franche-Comté, Switzerland and the present German
territory, without Schleswig-Holstein, Brandenburg, Berlin and Mecklemburg
(d) Excluding Nord-Pas de Calais, Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Comté, Corsica
(e) Brandenburg and Berlin, Mecklemburg, former big Polish voïvodies of Szczecin,
Koszalin and Olsztyn, oblast of Kaliningrad
(f) Excluding the present European Turkey; including Hungary, without the counties of
Komarom, Sopron, Vas, Veszprem and Zala, Croatia, Vojvodina, Rumania, without
Transylvania, Moldova and the Ukrainian oblasts of Odessa, Nikolaiev, Kherson, Crimea,
Zaporojie, Donetsk, Lougansk
(g) Austria, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Transylvania, former big Polish voïvodies
of Zielona Gora, Wroclaw, Opole, Katowice, Hungarian counties of Komarom, Sopron, Vas,
Veszprem and Zala
(h) Present Poland, excluding the former big Polish voïvodies fastened to North-Eastern
Germany and to the Habsburgian possessions, oblast of Kaliningrad, Lithuania, Latvia,
Bielorussia, Ukrainian oblasts of Volhynia, Lvov, Transcarpathia, Rovno, Ternopol, Ivano-
Frankovsk, Jitomir, Khmielnitski, Vinnitsa, Tchernovtsy, Kiev, Tcherkassy, Kirovograd,
Poltava, Dniepropetrovsk
(i) Russia, including Ural, more the Ukrainian oblasts of Tchernigov, Sumy and Kharkov
(j) Including Schleswig-Holstein and Estonia
Source: personal calculations based on figures by P. Bairoch (1988)
19 The evolution of the urban port locations shows that mercantilist  capitalism and the
beginning of the Industrial Revolution were characterised by growing extraversion of the
European economy, whereas on the other hand a recentring began at the end of the 19th
century. This recentring was to increase further after the Second World War: in the west
with Fordism, which considerably increased the share of European markets as outlets for
industrial production and proportionately reduced the incorporation of raw material in
total output, and in the east with urban development linked to autarkic industrialisation.
Today, the development of agglomerations, conurbations and suburbanisation makes it
difficult to produce homogenous calculations at European level.  Nevertheless a rough
estimate based on urban population figures supplied by Fischer Weltalmanach (1997) is
sufficient to confirm the extent of this trend: in 1997 the 60 biggest European towns
accounted  for  118,548,000  inhabitants  (a  figure  that  under-estimated  the  numbers
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because  full  account  was  not  taken  of  the  actual  morphological  limits  of  large
agglomerations). Only 31 % were in a port location. The European territory (including the
Urals) of the former Soviet Union accounted for 8 % of the population of the 60 biggest
towns in 1900; this percentage is now 42 %. This last figure is doubtless overestimated
because of the better adjustment of administrative borders to urban actuality in the east
than in the west owing to the absence of local autonomy and the planned nature of town
developments, and on the other hand, the extent of suburbanisation in the west. But the
change in the figure is sufficient to demonstrate the extraordinary speed and the extent
to which the rural community was attracted to urban areas by forced industrialisation in
the Soviet Union.
20 In the western part of Europe, the opposition between Atlantic Europe with precocious
state formations and middle Europe with principalities and above all merchant towns,
was to become partly superimposed on the division between Roman Catholicism and
Protestantism. Admittedly the superimposition of the two divisions is not perfect, and the
origins of  Protestantism were multiple.  In some cases it  became attached to peasant
protest movements against landlords and the Church, which supported the former or
itself behaved like a large landowner. In other cases Protestantism became involved in
emancipation drives by the urban bourgeoisie against the constraints imposed by the
Church or by traditional economic organisations and guilds supported by the Church
which  blocked  opportunities  for  individual  economic  initiative.  In  some  cases,  too,
Protestantism was adopted by the royalty or nobility in a bid to promote their  own
political interests. Be that as it may, with the development of Protestantism, religion,
which was already a more individual matter in the Catholic world than in the Orthodox
world, became a more private affair, but a private affair which at the same time guided
the economic and cultural ethics of élites and promoted literacy. The positive effects
which Protestantism had on economic development were either the result of Protestant
bourgeoisies  invested  with  political  power  (the  Netherlands),  or  sharing  it  with  the
monarchy (United Kingdom), but also of educated rural societies capable of underpinning
the bourgeois investments (Netherlands) or of benefiting from the early agrarian reforms
introduced  by  the  enlightened  despotism  of  the  monarchy  (Denmark,  Sweden).  The
Counter Reformation, on the contrary, led to economic stagnation. Some adverse effects
of this were felt right up until the start of the 20th century.
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Table 3. Sea port location.
(a) Excluding Bohemia and Austria, but including Silesia, Pomerania and Eastern Prussia 
Source: personal calculations based on figures by P. Bairoch (1988) and by Justus
Perthes’ Taschen-Atlas (1902)
21 But the main consequence of transferring the centre of gravity of the European economy
to the Atlantic shores and,  in particular,  to the areas in which bourgeois power was
predominant (Netherlands) or in any case associated with the monarchy (England, and
France to a lesser extent), was the formation of a world economy and an international
division  of  labour  in  which  the  more  remote  parts  of  Europe,  both  eastern  and
Mediterranean, were placed in a semi-peripheral position, specialising in supplying to
north-western Europe agricultural raw materials and, later, mineral raw materials. The
result was the reinforcement in these parts of Europe of a combination of royal power
and landed aristocracy. This was reflected in the accentuation of pressure on peasants,
particularly in the plains, and emerged among other things in the development of the
new serfdom which will replace the communal peasant structures in the parts of north-
eastern Europe the most open to Baltic trade. In some cases the landed aristocracy went
so far as to reject all state political commitments in order to concentrate on its estates,
therefore considering that it could do without the monarchy. This was the case in Poland,
and it led to the disappearance of the Polish State at the end of the 18th century. While in
Prussia  and  in  Austria-Hungary  the  enlightened  despotism of  the  monarchy  and  its
military ambitions managed to give rise to certain industrial mercantilist developments
underpinned by the State, this was less true in Russia and even less so in Ottoman Europe.
The latter found itself in a peripheral position on two counts: subject to the interests of
Constantinople and the big tchiflik landowners on the one hand, but on the other forming
part of an Empire which was itself entering a decline and about to become marginalised
in the world economy from the start of the 18th century.
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Figure 4. The balance of power in the political formations of the second half of the 18th century. 
 
Formation of the Nation States and the Industrial
Revolution
22 Knowledge of the nature of the state formations at the end of the 18th century is therefore
essential to understand the geography of the initial phases of the Industrial Revolution.
This  Revolution could  have  emerged only  in  territorial  formations  of  a  certain  size,
whereas  the  pre-industrial  market  economy  had  no  need  of  such  a  territorial  base,
although in some cases the territorial base (including its colonial extensions) reinforced
the merchant middle classes through the arrangements underlying their association with
the  monarchy.  Moreover,  the  existence  of  potential  colonial  outlets  was  to  be  an
important  factor  in  industrial development  in  a  19th century  in  which the  domestic
purchasing power was weak and the export of capital goods could supplement the limited
absorption capacity of  the national  market.  Understandably the Industrial  Revolution
could not have started early in a country like the Netherlands in which the bourgeoisie
predominated (the Protestant aristocracy having by now itself adopted the behaviour of
the bourgeoisie): apart from the consequences of the lack of coal (although there was peat
and wind power), the country was too small and the relative weakness of the central State
did  not  permit  the  upkeep of  a  strong and permanent military  fleet.  The  Industrial
Revolution  therefore  started  in  the  United  Kingdom,  in  an  average-sized  country,
admittedly favoured by its insular position and coal resources, but above all a country in
which the State was organised early on, in the context of an association imposed on the
monarchy by a strong trade-based middle class and an aristocracy which supported land-
based capitalism (Great Britain). In France the bourgeoisie had to overcome in a more
brutal fashion the contradictions that emerged from its association with the monarchy,
because of, among other things, the greater importance of traditional land ownership and
of the more conservative attitudes of the aristocracy. Here, too, however, the State was
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organised at an early stage and became established even before the Nation emerged.
More than in Great Britain, it was to continue to influence the shape of development
since the State is more necessary for the bourgeoisie to support and finance growth that
arrived a little later and therefore required more capital. Of course it cannot be claimed
that Belgium, where the industrial revolution got off the ground even before it did in
France, was an average-sized country with a long state tradition. But it did benefit from
the  combination  of  a  strong  urban  merchant  and  craft  tradition  (although this  was
somewhat sleepy), from the effects of diffusion as a result of its proximity to the initial
centres of the industrial revolution, from the influences, before independence, of French
and Dutch capitalism, not to mention the importance of its coal resources that had long
been exploited.
 
Table 4. Urban development in Europe in 1850 (towns of over 10,000 inhabitants).
(a) Including Switzerland and Schleswig-Holstein; excluding Alsace, Lorraine, eastern
Prussia and Mecklemburg
(b) Including Alsace-Lorraine and Savoy
(c) Prussia, Berlin, Brandenburg, Pomerania, Poznania, Silesia and Mecklemburg
(d) With Galicia, Bukovina and Dalmatia; without Bosnia-Herzegovina
(e) Including Trentino; excluding Lombardy-Venezia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Galicia and
Bukovina
(f) Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Walachia-Moldavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, without the
present European Turkey
(g) Excluding Finland as well as Poland; including Bessarabia
(h) Without Schleswig-Holstein; with the Grand-Duchy of Finland
Source: personal calculations based on figures by P. Bairoch (1988)
 
Building a continental area: identities, differences and urban developments i...
Belgeo, 1-2-3-4 | 2000
13
Figure 5. The industrial revolution.
23 In  middle  Europe,  towns  and  the  merchant  middle  classes  were  historically  well
developed,  but  on  a  fragmented  territorial  basis.  Thus  when  territorial  unification
became necessary as a basis for the formation of a national market and industrialisation,
the concept of Nation preceded that of State. The urban bourgeoisie had to ally itself with
an  ambitious  monarchy  to  obtain  the  necessary  territorial  frameworks:  the  Rhine
bourgeoisie allied itself with the King of Prussia, after which the Habsburg power caused
a more endogenous endeavour to fail by attacking the Diet of Frankfurt, which eventually
cost it the defeat of Sadowa and the establishment of the Reich3; the Italian bourgeoisie
allied itself with the King of Piedmont, in agreement and in a compromise with France,
after the latter had caused the failure of an attempt to establish a Roman Republic (but
France will then delay the annexation of the Pontifical States by the new Kingdom).
24 Thus we arrive at the fundamental causes of the continuity between the maps of pre- and
post-Industrial Revolution Europe. Admittedly the centres of industrialisation of the first
(1780-1812-1842) and still largely of the second Kondratieff cycle (1842-1873-1896)4 are
very much linked to coal resources. But these are not exploited and above all do not
generate endogenous development except where capital is readily available nearby and
where  mining  can  be  linked  to  industrialisation  based  on  the  resumption  of  craft
traditions.  The  initial  industrialisation may certainly  trigger  off  sensitive  geographic
shifts, but only on a large or medium-sized scale. British industrialisation started first in
the coalmines of the Pennines and passed London by. However London kept political and
commercial  control,  based on an age-old state tradition.  The centre of gravity of the
Belgian economy shifted from the Flemish textile industry (which lacked coal and which
was to decline in a lengthy crisis connected with the delay in modernisation of a proto-
industry in which the Belgian capital was not interested) to the Walloon coalmines, but
with control remaining in Brussels. The initial industrial centres in the Rhine are in the
coalfields, not in the large Rhine towns or even in the Hellweg towns. But on the small
scale of a map of Europe, the first endogenous industrial developments remained close to
the urban and capitalist centres of the earlier market economy, in the countries where
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the socio-political structures permitted a premature industrial revolution. Apart from
these areas, coal managed to engender isolated examples of industrial development, but
which was in most cases controlled from the outside, and the initial developments were
not  disseminated  throughout  the  national  economy  (Asturias,  Donetz).  That  is  the
essential cause of the small-scale continuities between population distribution and wealth
distribution before and after the Industrial Revolution.
 
The lagging behind of Centre-Eastern, Eastern and
South-Eastern Europe
25 In Centre-Eastern, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, industrialisation was to be delayed
by  the  maintaining  of  absolutist  structures  based  on  the  powerful  aristocratic  land-
owning class,  by the mediocre level  of  the agrarian productive base,  by the skeletal
nature of the young national bourgeoisie classes in regions that were under-developed in
urban terms, and hence lagging behind in terms of formation of Nation States, and by the
emergence of the latter due to foreign intervention in the context of a national identity
combining peasant and religious elements. The national ideology of the young States was
based on highlighting difference compared with others,  and on very remote identity
references that are fairly mythologised: the Czar Dushan for the Serbs, ancient Illyria for
the Albanians, and the Dacians for the Romanians, etc. The holistic nature of this national
identity  ideology was thus reflected in Romania by the refusal  to  recognise regional
special features, regional cuisine and regional dialect nuances, while at the same time (as
a result of its peasant past) the wealth and diversity of local folklore was underlined in a
rather schizophrenic approach. Difference was presented as being external to identity.
26 Population density maps for this part of Europe remain largely marked by the imprint of
continuity with the rural past, sometimes reinforced by contrasts of fertility: high density
in Catholic Poland, outside the areas of big German landowners; vacuums in the Pripyat ‘
Marshes,  frontier between the Catholic  and Orthodox worlds;  relatively empty plains
recently  won  back  from  the  Turks  (Hungarian  plain),  sometimes  with  forms  of
colonisation leading to early low fertility levels (Banat); late subsistence of forms of big
land ownership and important export culture maintaining quite low population densities
(Walachia), while the sheltered areas of mountains and piedmonts were more densely
populated (Walachia and Moldavian piedmonts). In opposition to this overall continuity,
the most spectacular discrepancy on a small scale is, in Eastern Europe, the inversion of
the density between Russia and Ukraine: the latter had been emptied by the Mongol and
Tartar invasions, leading to the mediaeval Russian withdrawal into the forests, where the
political hub of Moscow was to become the main settlement centre. From the 17th and 18th
centuries, the more fertile steppes were repopulated, restoring a gradient of population
density that complied more closely with natural features, in the semi-peripheral context
of a major cereal-exporting economy. It was not until the end of the 19th century that the
first  centres  of  industrialisation  were  established  in  the  Donetz  coalmining  area,
controlled exogenously by Western European capitalism, and above all  the deliberate
Stalinian industrialisation drives which increased the growth of the eastern Ukraine area
and produced other major changes in the population density map of this part of Europe,
particularly in the Urals. Stalinian industrialisation, planned to serve a monopolistic form
of State capitalism, created centres of development that were independent of the old
capitalist centres, which in fact were very weak in the Czarist Empire. Nonetheless, this
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deliberate  policy  and  the  priority  given  to  heavy  industry  did  not  undermine  the
importance  of  the  nucleus  of  population  density  in  the  central  industrial  region,
organised around Moscow.
 
From the third Kondratieff cycle to globalisation and
the increasing importance of services within the
economy
27 The  first  two  Kondratieff  cycles  led,  on  a  large and  medium  scale,  to  changes  in
population distribution, in favour of coalmining areas. From the third Kondratieff cycle
(1896-1912-1947), the big towns and traditional urban areas became important again as
main focus of economic development. This reinforced further the effect of continuities.
This was because industry no longer needed to be located close to coal sources from the
end of the 19th and above all in the 20th century because of the reduction of transport
costs, the development of new energy sources and the significant growth in services and
technological training of labour, for which large towns are preferential locations. This
encouraged the development of metropolitan regions.
28 The gradual weakening of the constraints of location near the coal industry (first for light
industries)  also permitted the revitalisation of  regions with old urban and merchant
traditions, sleepy since the Counter Reformation but eager to be given new impetus. The
economic revival in the 20th century can be said to have been based there on initiatives by
small and medium-sized local entrepreneurs, in a flexible economy which was already
creating niches within the triumphant Fordist system and in areas characterised by a
paternalist socio-political framework governed by social christianism (Flanders, southern
Germany, north-eastern Italy) or founded at least on a strong socio-political  regional
consensus  (Third Italy).  The success  of  these  areas,  which correspond largely  to  the
industrial  districts,  was based both on a rich urban past,  even though this remained
dormant  for  several  centuries,  and  a  sound  agricultural  basis,  with  the  new
entrepreneurs emerging from both backgrounds. This regional consensus, in regions that
are now prosperous but which had long remained lagging behind, may have been based
on strong resentment against a national central State if the region had been subjected to
the authority of a central power which neglected it economically and bullied it culturally
(Flanders,  Catalonia,  Basque  Country),  or  was  at  least  based  on  solid  conservative
particular-isms (Bavaria). Now that European unification is reducing the importance of
the Nation State as the compulsory framework for economic development, it may also
give rise to the populist ‘anti-bureaucratic’ regionalism of the northern Italian Leagues.
29 The conjunction of a first phase of industrialisation based on coal and a second phase of
metropolitan industrialisation, followed by attraction to littorals which was underpinned
by coastal heavy and petrochemical-based industrialisation during Fordism and by the
development  of  tourism,  was  to  lead  to  the  abandonment  of  the  interior  of  certain
countries  through  a  rural  exodus,  particularly  in  countries  where  economic  under-
development was paired with state centralisation (Spain and Portugal), or where state
centralisation was combined with the age-old survival of archaic agrarian practices and a
prematurely low level of fertility (France).
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Figure 6. A synthetic regionalisation of Europe.
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Table 5. Reinforcement of population density contrasts in certain European countries.
Based on the counties in Great Britain, the departments in France, the provinces in Italy and Spain, the
voivodes in Poland, the kreis in Germany (Regierungsbezirke in 1980). One-fifth of the area of the
country corresponds to 45,000 km² in Great Britain, 110,000 km² in France, 92,000 km² in Germany
(50,000 km² in 1980, for West Germany only), 78,000 km² in Poland, 65,000 km² in Italy (60,000 in
1980) and 100,000 km² in Spain.
Sources: J. Haliczer (1934) and personal calculations based on national statistical
reports for 1980
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Table 6. Level of per capita product, with purchasing power at parity, within current political limits
(At 1990 Geary-Khamis international dollars until 1985; in PPP$ at current prices in 1997).
(a) Without the territory of former GDR from 1950 on
(b) Including the Marches, Umbria and Latium
(c) Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland
(d) Catalonia, Balearic Islands, Valencia, Aragon, Navarra, Rioja, Basque provinces,
Cantabria, Asturias, Madrid
(e) Including the former GDR from 1950, Poland, former Czechoslovakia, Hungary
(f) Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, former Yugoslavia
(g) Including the asian part of the Balkans until 1982
(h) Western Europe, Scandinavia and Italy
Sources: personal calculations based on figures by Maddison (1995), I.T. Berend & G. Ranki (1982),
UNDP World Development Report (1999), EUROSTAT and national reports. Personal estimates for the
breakdown between northern and southern Italy in 1913 and 1950.
30 After the Second World War, it is true that given the rarity and increasing expense of
labour, the rationalisation of industrial processes and the development of foreign and
state investments, Fordist-style industrialisation was to spread to areas that had long
remained rural, peripheral but relatively close to large developed areas in Europe which
still had sufficient reserves of labour (Paris Basin, Belgian Limburg). In Western Europe,
suburbanisation and the homogenisation of space through more flexible and more rapid
transport systems would also slow down, or even reverse, the process of polarisation of
population density.
31 Industrialisation was also to spread to the southern parts of Europe where European and
national development aid would take over the investment policies already begun by the
Fascist  Governments  (which  tended  to  intervene  in  economic  matters)  in  order  to
establish growth poles. This would permit the periphery of Western Europe to catch up,
to a certain extent. However, this process was to be slowed down and even interrupted
when  growth  based  on  Fordist  industrial  investment  during  phase  A  of  the  fourth
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Kondratieff cycle (from the end of the War to 1974) turned into a rather slow and then
more flexible, more globalised and more service-based growth, during phase B. In this
new context, the periphery integrated into the European Union suffered from a lack of
the advantages of the central regions, while at the same time having less comparative
advantages  in terms of  labour-intensive activities  than those offered by parts  of  the
extra-European periphery.
32 In  the  past  decade  we  have  witnessed  a  trend  towards  re-metropolisation  and  the
increased  concentration  of  headquarters,  financial  and  management  centres  in  the
biggest metropolitan areas, which are the best serviced on a world scale and are located
in  central  countries.  This  is  because  the  new  world  dynamics  which  is  forming  is
attracted by financial  activities and very high-tech sectors (information technologies,
biotechnology, etc.). But the effects of this re-metropolisation must be measured at the
scale  of  the  enlarged  metropolitan  regions.  They  are  not  necessarily  perceivable  in
statistical terms at the scale of the central agglomerations, on the contrary sometimes.
They do not rule out the possibility of the aggravation of social and economic problems
and growing dualisation in these central towns.
33 Integrated  (semi)-peripheral  regions  react  in  different  ways  to  these  new structural
conditions.  Some parts (as well  as centres of old industrialisation included in central
regions) are unable to heave themselves out of the post-Fordist slump: this has occurred
in  the  regions  where  the  framework  structures  are  the  least  dynamic,  the  least
enterprising and the most dominated by clientelist practices and a non-market sector ‘by
default’ or even parasitical. This is the case in southern Italy and Greece. Other parts of
the (semi)-peripheral  regions have,  however,  experienced vigorous growth.  This is  in
particular the case in Ireland: here semi-peripheral industrial development was based on
a particularly favourable cultural context for Anglo-Saxon investments,  geared to the
establishment of the labour-intensive segments of advanced technology, and it managed
to take considerable advantage (in a small  State)  of  aid granted under the European
Structural Fund. This aid also appears to have been very profitable for Portugal. For Spain
too, where the productive and banking systems are integrated in a quite effective way, it
was more profitable than for southern Italy, handicapped by the lack of interest paid to it
by national capital concentrated in the north of the country. 
 
The conditions for emerging from 50 to 80 years of
Communist interlude in Central-Eastern and Eastern
Europe 
34 In Russia, because of the historical weakness of national capitalism and structural under-
development  in  a  situation  in  which  the  aristocracy  was  a  dominant  force,
industrialisation could only take off in several centres dominated by Western European
capital. This delay was already reflected in defeat during the Russo-Japanese war, but it
led above all to the chaos of the First World War. Regardless of the political forces that
started it, the Bolshevik Revolution rapidly (or in any case once Stalin’s great five-year
plans got under way) turned into an operation of forced industrial  development in a
despotic and a-cyclical context, under the aegis of de facto State capitalism, and through
the radical transfer of human and material resources from agriculture to industry – the
cost being the sacrificing of agriculture, something from which the Russian economy has
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not yet recovered. This process was extended after the Second World War to Central-
Eastern Europe and the Balkan area.
35 The centralised planned economy permitted satisfactory economic performances during
the phase of basic heavy industrialisation, in the context of a rigid accumulation regime.
In  social  and educational  terms,  the  strict  supervision  of  society  was  also  a  success
initially, as can be seen for example in relation to life expectancy which caught up with
Western  Europe  up  until  around  1965,  thanks  to  the  benefits  of  mass  prophylactic
medicine. Apart from the question of individual liberties and insufficiency in relation to
agriculture, this administratively supervised industrial growth and the extremely rapid
urban  development  that  accompanied  it  had,  however,  a  ‘geographic  cost’:  the
authoritarian  social  and  economic  uniformisation  policies  were  based  on  spatial
restructuring.  The aim was both to  remove spatial  disparities  and to  uniformise  the
territory  by  means  of  deliberate  choices  regarding  location  of  industries.  Moreover,
centralised economic control crushed urban hierarchies and reduced horizontal relations
within  the  urban  system  in  favour  of  vertical  relations  between  small  towns  and
administrative chief  towns and between the latter and capital  cities.  It  subjected the
reorganisation of regional borders to the sole logic of centralised economic control, or
even of political decisions aimed at diluting or controlling ethnic communities.
36 The tight interweaving of economic and political logics – all radical economic reforms
challenging, by their very nature, the actual legitimacy of the constraints imposed by the
centralised political system – explains why the system proved incapable of shifting to a
more flexible regime which would have been essential to ensure the development of an
economy based on the rapid integration of  advanced technology into the production
process. The opening up of the former Soviet Union to exports of raw materials on a more
massive scale after 1974, the under-development of agriculture leading to the extensive
importation of cereals, and the inability to adapt to new technology, which led to the
stopgap  measure  of  importing  turnkey  factories  which  were  ineffective  because  the
traditional centralised management system was retained, all led to a deep crisis in the
system which was reflected in the halting of  economic growth in the 1980s,  despite
continued investments. The crisis also emerged in the social arena. The changeover to
advanced medicine, which gave a boost to life expectancy in the west, did not happen
here. From the spatial point of view, the growing atony highlighted the role of the lost
diversity for stimulating exchanges and economic dynamism.
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Figure 7. Evolution of life expectancy and fertility in Western and Eastern Europe and in Russia.
37 This complex crisis was to precipitate (within a few months) the top-down implosion of a
political  system that had until  then (no doubt wrongly) been presented as extremely
monolithic. The implosion essentially benefited some of the former nomenklatura and
technocratic élites,  who privatised the economy for their own benefit and placed the
Soviet system in a new peripheral situation vis-à-vis the world economy. Far from solving
the social crisis, this step accentuated it: it was even more badly received by the people
because no clear economic or political prospects were emerging in their eyes (except
perhaps in the countries closest to the European Union, which had the best chances of
succeeding  with  semi-peripheral  integration)  and  because  the  inhabitants  of  these
countries, not only the élites, felt close to the cultural values of Europe or shared them
sufficiently to use the European Union as a reference model, albeit one that was largely
inaccessible. The crisis materialised in an explosion of social inequalities, in some cases in
recomposition  between  the  rural  and  urban  communities,  and  was  also  reflected  in
migration  and  demographic  effects,  with  a  collapse  of  fertility.  In  terms  of  life
expectancy,  even more  so  than in  the  1980s,  the  main  opposition in  Europe is  now
between  the  east  and  west,  whereas  it  was  still  significant  between  the  north  and
Mediterranean south at the beginning of the 1960s.
38 The continuity between (at least a part of) the former nomenklatura and the present
élites may induce them to legitimise themselves by engaging in a relentless pursuit of
nationalist,  chauvinistic  positions  which  are  connected  with  and  revitalised  by
traditional, peasant and religious forms of national feeling, particularly where the lack of
positive economic results is most blatant and where social regression is most evident.
They obviously represent a political lever that is very easy to apply because the delay in
the formation of Nation States in this part of Europe has often allowed complex ethnic
situations to persist, or at least the memory of them – as can been seen from the anti-
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Semitism of a Poland without Jews! This is obviously less true in the most western parts of
the former Soviet bloc, where the national movement had sometimes already reached, to
a greater or lesser degree,  the stage of  constitution of  a democratic state before the
introduction of Communism, where the historical urban base was more deeply rooted
and, above all, where more favourable conditions regarding proximity to Western Europe
permitted more positive growth prospects based on the exploitation of a skilled, low-paid
workforce  and external  control  of  the  economy,  either  through direct  ownership  of
capital  or  through the establishment  of  subcontracting links  in the context  of  semi-
peripheral integration into the Western European productive system. The further east
and south-east one goes, the more the power of the converted élites is based on sole and
more or less Mafia-based control of a disarticulated internal economy and on imports/
exports, particularly the exporting of raw materials, with particularly poor performances
in terms of GDP evolution.
 
Conclusions 
39 Europe is  built  on an organic integration dialectic between economy and culture.  Its
considerable  diversity  and  variety  even  on  a  great  scale  is  a  result  of  its  ancient
civilisation (unlike North America), but also of the historical fragmentation of its political
frameworks  (unlike  China). It  is  marked  by  strong  divisions,  the  prime  ones  being
religious divisions,  which are not themselves dissociated from economic and cultural
developments. Some of its divisions go back to over a millennium ago. Yet this diversity
does not rule out a number of common references: Europe does exist.
40 The unequal development levels in Europe, just like the continent’s population density
map, cannot be understood, at least on a small scale, without reference to the long-term
historical processes, which comprise the geography of innovation and the differentiation
of socio-political  structures on the continent on the eve of the Industrial  Revolution,
without taking account of old differential levels of urbanity and without a grasp of the
structuring  of  the  European  economy  during  the  mercantilist,  pre-industrial,  world
economy phases, which spread from the Western European cradle.
41 The  Nation  State  framework,  more  or  less  completed,  has  become  the  compulsory
ideological reference for political organisation in Europe in the 19th century. Now in the
west it is beginning to be challenged by the unification imposed as a result of the growing
monopolisation  and  ‘worldisation’  of  the  economy,  but  we  are  at  the  same  time
witnessing a return to a local socio-political level,  which sometimes goes so far as to
question the nation state from the bottom up, but generally in a democratic way. In the
east, the nation state is being rebuilt, sometimes rather bloodily, in a context in which,
paradoxically, there is a holistic reaffirmation of national identity and a late and savage
discovery of frenzied individualism. In this part of Europe, the references to a common
European  identity  are  also  becoming  a  source  of  frustration  since  the  economic
disparities with the west are of approximately the same extent as between the latter and
the Maghreb.
42 On the smallest scale, the Communist phase confirmed and is the result of a pre-existing
division. There is little risk that this division will be removed in the short or medium
terms by reintegrating this part of Europe into the world economy on a semi-peripheral
or peripheral basis. This raises the question of the enlargement of the European Union, at
least beyond the first group of candidate countries, particularly as regards preserving
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social legislation, in a context in which the forces calling for rapid enlargement are being
steered by economic rather than by political and social considerations. To paraphrase V.
Rey, the question now is how to link common identity and heterogeneity. Paradoxically
the challenges are thus doubtless more serious than as regards the relations to be forged
with Mediterranean Muslim countries, where the question of shared identity does not
arise.
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NOTES
1. And also with the creation by Genoa and Venice of maritime routes circumventing Europe.
2. Which did not, however, prevent Andalusia from being the most urbanised part of Spain until
the 19th century, and also from benefiting partly from the opening onto the New World.
3. Louis Dumont thus contrasted the French universalist model - ‘I am a person first and French
by  accident’,  with  the  motto  ‘Liberty  -  Equality  -  Fraternity’  on  the  façade  of  the  National
Assembly, with the German model: ‘I am German first, and a person because I am German’, with
‘Dem Deutschem Volke’  on the façade of  the Reichstag.  But  unlike what  can be observed in
Central-Eastern and Eastern Europe, the German model did not reject regionalism, an ideological
continuation  of  the  original  fragmentation.  It  is  structured,  as  in  France,  on  an  exclusively
secular basis. 
4. But  already  much  less  during  the  second  Kondratieff  cycle.  Paris  was  a  major  centre  of
industrial development in France where industrialisation accompanied the development of the
railways, whereas in Great Britain, where the start of the industrial revolution was based, in
terms  of  transport,  only  on  the  canals  and  coastal  navigation,  London  experienced  relative
industrial regression compared with the textile and coal centres at the end of the 18th century
and in the first half of the 19th century. Belgium is in an intermediate position: the basis for
industrialisation was the coal mines, but industrial growth was just as dynamic in Brussels as in
the  Walloon  coal  basins  in  the  1840s  (and  also  quite  soon  in  Antwerp).  The  dynamism  of
manufacturing in metropolitan centres was greater than that of Wallonia from the 1870s on.
ABSTRACTS
Despite  its  common  cultural  heritage,  Europe  is  the  continent  in  which  there  is  greatest
diversity. This diversity, as well as the distribution of people and wealth, goes back a long way in
history. The geography of the industrial revolution and the process of formation of nation states
can only be understood when looked at in terms of a continuation of mediaeval Europe and of the
formation of the economic mercantilist system, concentrated in Western Europe. Pre-industrial
urban population density was a major factor in the subsequent differentiation. The Communist
interlude in Central and Eastern Europe is ending up with the reintegration on a peripheral and
semi-peripheral basis of this part of the continent into the world economy and the revival of
acute nationalism. The extent of the disparity in economic terms between this area and Western
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Europe is a particularly daunting challenge, given the fact that the populations in Centre-Eastern
and Eastern Europe share the same identity and references points as those in Western Europe.
Europe, regional diversity, spatial production, population pattern, towns
L’Europe  est  le  continent  où  la  diversité  est  la  plus  importante,  au-delà  de  fonds  culturels
communs. Cette diversité, de même que la répartition des hommes et de la richesse, s’inscrivent
dans les temps longs de l’histoire. La géographie de la révolution industrielle et les modalités de
formation  des  Etats-Nations  ne  peuvent  se  comprendre  que  dans  la  continuité  de  l’Europe
médiévale  et  de  la  formation  du  système  économique  mercantiliste,  centré  sur  l’Europe
occidentale.  Les  densités  urbaines  pré-industrielles  sont  un  facteur  important  des
différenciations ultérieures. L’intermède communiste en Europe centrale et orientale se termine
par  une  réintégration  semi-périphérique  ou  périphérique  de  cette  partie  du  continent  dans
l’économie  mondiale  et  un  regain  de  nationalismes  exacerbés.  L’ampleur  des  disparités
économiques avec l’Europe occidentale représente un enjeu d’autant plus dramatique que les
populations de l’Europe centre-orientale et orientale partagent des références identitaires avec
celles de l’Europe occidentale.
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